Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
THE UNITED STATES' REJECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STRATEGIC ERROR
From the Armenian Genocide at its opening through the continuing tragedy of Darfur, the Twentieth Century witnessed numerous atrocities and war crimes.
Throughout, the international community struggled to find a method of ensuring that those responsible for these brutal acts were held responsible for their crimes. The ad hoc tribunals that resulted have varied in their procedures and effectiveness, and have often led to charges of "victor's justice." Therefore, the hope arose that a permanent tribunal, with clearly defined jurisdiction and procedures, would be more effective in addressing the massive crimes that show no sign of disappearing.
In 1990, the United States joined the efforts to establish an international criminal court. 1 These efforts coalesced into the Rome Conference, where the international community sought to fashion an institution that would have the authority to accomplish these tasks, but not trample individual sovereignty. On July 17, 1998 The Bush administration and Congress have pursued a markedly hostile attitude towards the ICC. President Bush made the U.S. refusal to recognize the authority of the ICC a part of his National Security Strategy for 2002, 5 and Congress passed legislation designed to not only shield U.S. personnel from the Court, but to also deny foreign and military aid to countries that participate in the ICC. 6 These actions constitute a strategic mistake in the use of the informational and diplomatic elements of power. Given that there is little or no risk that the ICC would impact on U.S. military or humanitarian operations, the United States should sign and ratify the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute
The ICC is an international court within the United Nations system, empowered to exercise jurisdiction over individuals accused of "the most serious crimes of international concerns." 7 The Court is overseen by the Assembly of States Parties, which consists of one member from each nation that has approved the Statute. 8 The 18
judges of the ICC are divided into a Pre-Trial Chamber, which makes the initial decisions as to what cases will be accepted by the ICC for trial and then assists in the investigative process, and Trial and Appeals Chambers. 9 Judges serve for a term of nine years, and are not eligible for reelection. 10 No more than one judge may be from any nation. 11 Judges may be removed from the Court if they are determined by a majority of the other judges to be exhibiting bias. 12 The ICC also contains the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), charged with investigating referrals to the Court, recommending whether the case should be accepted, and prosecuting those cases. 13 
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The ICC currently has jurisdiction over three crimes: genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes. 14 The Statute provides limitations on each of these crimes.
Although the statute provides for jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, these provision has not been implemented to date.
Genocide is defined as acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 15 The key word here is "intent" -a conviction requires proof that the actions taken were designed to destroy a defined group. This requirement will ensure that its reach is limited. A similar restriction is imposed by the definition of crimes against humanity. Prosecution under that section is limited to acts committed as part of "a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population." 16 Again, conviction under this section requires not only proof that an individual committed any of the specified acts, but that he did so as part of a broader attack directed against the population as a whole. Conventions for internal conflicts. 17 Although noting that it is concerned in particular with war crimes committed as part of a larger plan or policy, 18 this section provides the broadest current reach as the limiting language is not mandatory.
The potential reach of the Rome Statute is greatly limited by other provisions.
Most important of these is the principle of "complementarity." The jurisdiction of the ICC does not apply where a state has jurisdiction to investigate and/or prosecute the allegations, unless it is shown that state is unwilling or unable to act. 19 So long as the 4 investigation of the alleged crime is not a sham, a decision not to prosecute the accused will act as a bar to the ICC taking the case. 20 A state is deemed to be unwilling to investigate an allegation if proceedings are delayed, are initiated to shield the person from criminal liability, or are not independent and impartial. 21 Determinations as to whether a state is unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute an allegation are made by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court, and may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber. 22 Allegations of crimes and requests for investigation are initially referred to the OTP. 23 Allegations can be referred to OTP in three ways. First, a state that has ratified the Rome Statute may refer the alleged crime. 24 Second, the U.N. Security Counsel can refer a situation for investigation. 25 Finally, OTP can initiate an investigation based on information received from other sources. 26 This last provision has caused significant controversy. 27 Once a referral is received, the OTP is charged with conducting an initial investigation to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate a case. 28 If such a basis is found, the allegations are referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of a formal investigation. Only after this approval is the OTP permitted to continue the investigation. 29 The Pre-Trial Chamber can then issue arrest warrants and summonses to assist the Prosecutor in gathering evidence. 30 If the allegations are considered appropriate for trial, the case is referred to the Trial Chamber. 31 During the trial, the accused has most of the rights that we recognize as essential to fundamental due process. He is presumed innocent, and guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 32 Unless the Court determines that evidence constitutes national security information, the proceedings are open and the accused is 5 entitled to be present unless his behavior becomes disruptive. 33 He is to be given time adequate to consult with an attorney and to prepare a defense, to have an interpreter provided at no cost, and he may not be compelled to testify. Finally, the OTP is required to disclose to the defense any information in his possession that might tend to show the innocence of the accused, or mitigate his responsibility. 34 Either OTP or the accused may appeal the ultimate decision of the Trial Chamber as to guilt or innocence, and the sentence. 35 The Statute specifically addresses the responsibility of commanders and other superiors for the actions of their subordinates. It holds commanders responsible for the crimes of elements under their control where the commander knew, or should have known, the forces were committing or about to commit the crimes, or where the commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such crimes or refer them for investigation when they were discovered. 36 The defense of obedience to orders is specifically rejected. 37 These provisions follow the current dictates of the international law of armed conflict.
U.S. Concerns
Before and after the Rome Statute was adopted, U.S. officials have raised concerns with the Rome Statute. The primary argument raised by the Clinton administration was that the Rome Statute gives the Court potential jurisdiction over citizens of non-party states where a person commits the enumerated crimes on the soil of an ICC member state. 38 Therefore, they worried that U.S. commanders and senior governmental civilians could theoretically be charged for their conduct while engaged in peacekeeping or humanitarian relief efforts. This possibility was seen as an impediment 6 to the U.S. becoming involved in such operations. 39 This argument, although still presented, is not primarily relied on by the Bush administration. 40 The Bush administration has focused on arguments concerning the authority of the OTP to initiate investigations with the consent of only two judges. This power, it is argued, opens the possibility of prosecutions based on political considerations. The fear is that the ICC might be used by the international community to punish senior United States commanders, or government officials, for taking actions they deem necessary for U.S. security interests. 41 Indeed, the Prosecutor recently hinted that senior government officials in the Sudan could soon be charged in connection with the situation in Darfur. 42 Another argument is that the Rome Statute's inclusion of the crime of aggression usurps the role of the U.N. Security Council. 43 Given the lack of international consensus concerning the definition of aggression, this is a real concern. However, this reinforces that the United States should be involved in the process, not awaiting the results.
ICC: Action and Inaction
A review of the actions of the ICC over the nearly six years since it has been operating shows that, at least to date, the concerns listed above have proved groundless.
Uganda. Approximately 18 months after it came into being, the first matter was referred to OTP for investigation. In December 2003, the government of Uganda referred the situation with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda to the ICC, and on January 29, 2004, OTP announced that it had opened an investigation. 44 Soon afterwards, the ICC issued its first arrest warrants for five leaders of the LRA, to 7 include Joseph Kony, its founder. 45 These warrants charged that, as part of a long running insurgency against the government of Uganda, and specifically after the effective date of the ICC's jurisdiction, the LRA had engaged in the "brutalization of civilians," to include murder, kidnapping, sexual enslavement, mutilations, and impressing children as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. 46 The five were charged with 12 counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war crimes. To date, none of the five have been captured. 47 Two years of peace talks recently seemingly floundered over the issue of the ICC warrants. Under the peace treaty, the Ugandan government agreed to establish a special court to try those accused of crimes connected to the insurgency, and then request that the ICC dismiss its case. 48 The LRA is demanding the withdrawal of the warrants before they disarm, 49 as it is likely the ICC would refuse to return the case to Uganda if it finds that the proposed tribunal would not conduct an adequate investigation and/or prosecution. However, if the ICC warrants are truly the last impediment to peace in Uganda, a refusal to withdraw them will almost certainly lead to a continuation of war crimes and depredations against the civilian population. 50 How the ICC resolves this dilemma will significantly impact its legitimacy in the coming years. 56 presumably in an attempt to punish members of the former government and their international supporters. The investigation is notable for two reasons. First, the majority of the alleged crimes concern rape and sexual abuse. 57 Second, the investigation will focus on allegations of criminal conduct by both government and rebel forces during this time period, to include forces controlled by Bozize. 58 By not limiting the investigation of one side, even where such a limitation was sought by the referring state, the case has demonstrated the objectiveness and neutrality of OTP.
Darfur. The final case pending before the ICC involves Darfur, Sudan, and was referred to it by the U.N. Security Council. 59 The U. Darfur, particularly with regard to the Janjaweed. In this capacity, he allegedly assisted in the war crimes and crimes against humanity, and so was charged with the same crimes levied against Kushayb.
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The decision to name Haroun as a suspect was unexpected. 63 At the time the proposed charges were released, Haroun was serving as the Minister for State for Humanitarian Affairs, the individual charged with coordinating relief efforts to the refugees in Darfur (a role in which he was much criticized by civilian aid agencies).
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However, it again demonstrated the dedication of the OTP to the goals of the Rome Statute.
On May 2, 2007, the ICC issued arrest warrants for both men. 65 To date, Sudan's government has refused to turn over either man as a result of these warrants, and disputes the jurisdiction of the ICC in the matter as it claims its courts are capable of investigation and prosecution. 66 As a further slap in the face of the ICC and the international community at large, in September 2007 the government of the Sudan announced that Haroun had been appointed to lead its investigation into human rights abuses in Darfur. 67 The Prosecutor recently disclosed that his office is nearly ready to present evidence concerning the refusal of Sudan to surrender Haroun and Kushayb, and an investigation into those "who bear the greatest responsibility for ongoing and systematic attacks against civilians in Darfur," which most believe will lead to charges against Sudan's top leadership. 68 Critics could argue that such a decision would raise concerns that only the war crimes of one side are being investigated by the ICC in Darfur. Such an investigation could be painted as a selective, and political, prosecution. 69 However, the ICC is charged not with investigating all attacks on non-combatants, but larger, genocide-style attacks. While the rebels in Darfur have attacked civilians, their conduct has not risen to this level. So, again, the OTP is following its charge.
The United States was torn on the Darfur vote. Acknowledging that genocide was occurring in Darfur, 70 the administration attempted to obtain support for the 11 appointment of an international commission of inquiry rather than support a referral to the ICC. When it became clear that this option had little support and that the situation would be referred to the ICC absent a veto, U.S. representatives requested a provision that specified the ICC could not take action against citizens of non-ICC members. The Security Council agreed to this addition, and the United State abstained from the vote. 71 The United States was influenced, at least in part, by the importance of having the international community speaks with one voice on the situation in Darfur. 72 Since the referral, the United States has indicated that it would be willing to consider providing assistance to the ICC investigation and subsequent prosecution, within the constraints of U.S. law. 73 As the ICC has made no such request to date, the extent of this promise is unclear. It is also unclear what constraints the provisions of the American Servicemember's Protection Act, discussed below, would place on any such request. investigations. 74 Of those, only ten situations were analyzed, with four accepted (discussed above), five ongoing, and two dismissed. 75 The dismissal included allegations of war crimes by Coalition forces in Iraq.
In its published memorandum concerning this decision, the OTP noted that it had received over 240 communications urging an investigation into the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent Abu Ghraib scandal. 76 Despite this volume, the broad international resistance to the U.S. invasion, and world-wide outrage at the treatment of detainees, the OTP refused to open an investigation. This decision was based in part on an obvious jurisdictional defect -Iraq was not a signatory to the Rome Statute. 77 However, the OTP did not stop the analysis there. They went on to note that they found no evidence that "Coalition forces had [the] 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Therefore, it rejected a possible investigation into the crime of genocide. 78 The OTP went on to discuss allegations of war crimes related to the death of civilians during the "force on force" portion of the conflict. 79 The Prosecutor found that U.S. and U.K. forces had done intensive target analysis prior to the conflict designed to minimize civilian casualties, that they had legal advice available before and during the war, and that they continued to evaluate necessity and proportionality throughout. Therefore, the OTP determined that civilian populations were not intentionally targeted, and that in general civilian casualties did not result from war crimes. 80 The Prosecutor did find that allegations of the willful killing of from four to twelve civilians and a limited number of victims of inhuman treatment, for a total number of less than 20 persons, could be substantiated. The OTP found that such a limited number of possible war crimes did not rise to the level of gravity that would invoke the jurisdiction of the ICC. 81 Based on this determination, the OTP did not evaluate whether the principle of "complementarity" would prevent jurisdiction. However, the Prosecutor did note with approval that in each of the incidents that were identified as potential war crimes, U.S. and/or U.K officials had initiated investigations. It should be noted that the memorandum specifically does not address whether the U.S. invasion constituted the crime of aggression, as the ICC does not have jurisdiction over that offense. This topic will remain a concern of observers of the ICC until such time as that offense is defined, which will happen no sooner than 2010. 83 The ability to influence this discussion provides a strong argument for the U.S. to join the ICC system. While it is likely that aggression will be defined consistent with common international law, as was done when proportionality was written into the Rome Statute, and that the ICC will not seek to expand this definition to situations (such as Iraq) that do not fall squarely within the current definitions, our decision not to join with the international community in this debate may thus have significant strategic consequences.
U.S. Actions to Limit the ICC
The United States has taken specific actions to limit the reach of the ICC. Article 98 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC must respect agreements between states that deprive one state of turning over citizens of another that are acting in an official 14 capacity to the ICC without the consent of both states. 84 This provision is similar to those contained in Status of Forces agreements routinely negotiated by the U.S. and other nations. 85 The United States has negotiated 100 such agreements, 86 some with nations that are not a party to the Rome Statute. 87 The European Council initially balked at allowing its members to sign such agreements, but finally relented so long as the agreements were narrowly tailored. The ASPA authorizes the President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to free any U.S. service member or official detained by the ICC. 97 This provision caused great ridicule, including referrals to the ASPA as "the Hague Invasion
Act." 98 In testimony before Congress, David Sheffer, the lead U.S. representative at the ICC negotiations, characterized this section as "an alarmist provision that only complicates our ability to negotiate our common objective of protection [of U.S. personnel] from prosecution." The Clinton administration opposed the ASPA for a number of reasons, mostly related to its potential infringement on the President's authority to conduct foreign relations and as commander-in-chief. 101 The Department of Justice expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of numerous provisions of the statute, including the restrictions on complying with international judicial requests for assistance or providing assistance to law enforcement authorities. 102 Despite these objections, the ASPA was passed overwhelmingly. 103 The Bush administration has used the ASPA to pressure nations to sign Article 98 agreements under the threat of the loss of foreign aid. 104 These actions contributed to the EU's initial prohibition against the signing of such agreements. 105 This statute is a serious strategic mistake. It complicates our national security and foreign policy interests, and gives support to the impression that the U.S has no interest in cooperating in or abiding by international law, unless that law happens to act for our benefit. As such, it undermines the information and diplomatic areas of power.
It is much too harsh a reaction to the perceived problems with the ICC. Further, its coercive use by the Bush administration in its campaign against the ICC has alienated international public opinion. Finally, if it is indeed the case that the "tails" of Presidential waivers and the ability to assist international efforts to apprehend war criminals wag the along with an examination of the actions taken by the ICC so far, also refutes the claim that the ICC will engage in political prosecutions. The ICC has not to date sought to prosecute any individual or investigate any situation because those actions are unpopular world-wide. Instead, it has limited itself to actions against horrific and largescale atrocities that the international community has not been able to adequately address. Through action and inaction, the OTP and the ICC have proven that they intend to operate according to its mandate.
Further, the structure of the ICC makes it nearly impossible for a political prosecution to occur. The OTP must secure the vote of at least two judges from the Pre-Trial chamber to launch a full-scale investigation. Then, the matter is referred to the judges of the Trial Chamber for the actual trial. Any result can be appealed to the Appellate Chamber. To engage in a political prosecution would require a conspiracy involving the majority of the judges of each of these separate chambers. The odds against such an occurrence are astronomical.
These odds could change significantly once the crime of aggression is added to the ICC's jurisdiction. Aggression as a war crime was charged at Nuremburg, and is a long standing concept in international law. The danger, of course, is that the Rome Statute will add a definition that would include U.S. actions under its current strategy of preventative war. Again, it is unlikely that such a broad definition will be adopted, given that international law recognizes that the right of self-defense includes the right to strike first in some instances. 108 However, U.S. involvement in the negotiation process on this issue would help minimize even further the chance of an overbroad definition. It is this involvement in the ICC process, sought by the Clinton administration but rejected by President Bush, that the U.S. should be seeking.
As demonstrated above, there is little chance of harm from the U.S joining the nations that have adopted the ICC. But are there benefits, other than an ability to help define aggression? The answer is a resounding yes. The United States is currently engaged in an international struggle over ideas. Whether this is defined as the War on
Terror or a Clash of Civilizations, America's ability to remain secure and to advance its interests in the diplomatic and economic spheres relies in large part on our success in this struggle. Currently, the U.S. is hampered in these efforts by the opinion of the international community that America is only willing to participate in the international process when assured the decision will come out in its favor. Any action that supports the impression that the U.S. seeks to exempt itself from the norms and restrictions of international law is a blow to U.S. interests. Such actions are made worse when
Congress passes legislation of doubtful constitutional validity that subjects the United
States to world-wide ridicule.
Joining the ICC would send a strong message to the international community that the United States is interested in finding a solution to the horrendous crimes that too often occurred in the past century. It would also provide strategic value to our efforts in the war of ideas. Given that the risk of impact on our military operations is extraordinarily low, and the value to be gained so potentially high, the United States should immediately sign the Rome Statute and ratify the treaty. 
